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ABSTRACT
The objective o f  this research is to investigate the effect of 
investment opportunity set on the association between 
managers' incentives to manage earnings and the level of 
earnings management. The incentives to engage in earnings 
management in this research measured by financial 
leverage level, firm’s size, and public.ownership or firm’s 
common stock. Discretionary accrual is used to measure 
level o f  earnings management. Result show that there are 
positive discretionary accruals and evidence support 
argument that the higher o f  investment opportunity set the 
greater positive effect o f  financial leverage and public 
ownership on the level o f  earnings management. Manager 
o f  firms with relatively more investment opportunity set 
would have wider opportunity or more discretion to 
manage reported earnings.
Keywords: Earnings management, investment opportunity 
set, information asymmetry.
Background
Earnings information is important indicator for evaluating firm financial 
performance. Managers determine the short term reported earnings of their 
umpanies by: 1 ) managing, providing leadership, and directing the use of 
esources in operation, 2 ) selecting the timing o f  some non operating events, and 
3) choosing the accounting methods that are used to measure short term
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earnings. Most managers always to exert a stable financial performance. 
Growing systematic evidence supports the argument that earnings management 
is a common practice in firms (Bagnoli and Watts, 2001; Beneish, 2001; 
AlNajjar and Rhiahi-Belkaoui, 2001). Managers of  firms routinely manipulate or 
'manage” reported financial information in response to a wide variety of 
incentives with potentially significant consequences to the firm’s management, 
investor, creditor, and others.
The level o f  earnings management will be higher if management has incentive 
and opportunity to do so (Dye, 1988; Trueman and Titman, 1988; Christensen et 
al., 1999). The opportunity to engage earnings management exists when the 
manager knows some things, which others do not. The existence o f  information 
asymmetry between firm management and firm shareholder is an necessary 
condition, which must be met for earnings management to exist. When 
information asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have necessary resources, 
incentives or access to relevant information to monitor manager’s action 
(Schipper. 1989).
The level o f  information asymmetry could be varying across the firms 
(Ambarish et al. 1987). The level o f  information asymmetry related to firms 
investment. The information asymmetry could be relative!) larger lor firms with 
relatively more investment opportunity set than firms with relatively more asset- 
in place. It is likely that manager in that firms have more specific knowledge 
about their firm’s assets and that value o f  the growth opportunities is less 
observable. There is therefore likely to be a relatively large informational 
asymmetry between manager and outsiders, especially if part o f  asset value 
comprises information that is proprietary. An increased investment opportunity 
set is expected to create opportunity for earnings management.
This research is molivated to extend previous earnings management research 
which focused on examining incentives and consequences o f  earnings 
management practices. Very little has been conducted in investigating 
environment surrounding earnings management practices. This study considers 
the level o f  firm’s investment opportunity set (IOS) as condition that represents 
the opportunity to wider practice o f  earnings management.
This research contributes to the extend association literature by examining the 
impact o f  investment opportunity set level, as a condition that represents the 
wider opportunity to practice earnings management, on the association between 
incentives and the magnitude o f  earnings management. Examining the
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interaction between investment opportunity set and manager’s incentives on the 
earnings management is important to the theory that the level o f  firm’s 
investment opportunity set can increase magnitude o f  earnings management that 
related to a number o f  incentives. The result o f  this research will useful to 
investor for better understanding reported earnings. Investors should not naively 
use the accounting income numbers without any adjustment for manipulation 
possibility o f  reported income. Accounting standard setter may find the result of 
this study useful for evaluating the mandated additional disclosure that give 
sufficient information for better understanding reported earning. Finally, the 
result o f  this research will useful to auditor for incentives to hold responsible for 
better quality for financial reporting o f  firm.
The purpose o f  this paper is to investigate the moderating effect o f  the level of 
investment opportunity set on the association between managers’ incentives to 
engage and the level o f  earnings management. "'V
Literature Review
Condition Giving Rise o f Earnings Management
Virtually prior research on earnings management has taken an economic 
perspective. That is the research has focus on question about the incentives 
managers have to manage earnings and the consequences o f  their manipulation 
action. Prior published researches also shown that managers’ action are related 
to a number o f  their incentives. These incentives range from efficient earnings 
management that cost-effectively resolves the firms’ agency problem to 
opportunistic earnings management that maximizes management welfare at the 
expense o f  other stakeholders.
Researches have detected earnings management in response to firm and industry 
specific such as high debt levels and avoiding debt covenant violation (Deakin, 
1979; Dhaliwal, 1980; Bowen et a/., 1981, Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981: 
Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994); reducing the possibility o f  an unfavorable ruling 
and the cost associated with antitrust violations (Cahan 1992; N a ’im dan 
Hartono, 1996), increasing the offering proceeds for its share o f  stock (Neil et 
al., 1995, Ranggan 1998, Richardson 1998, Teoh et al., 1998; Sutanto, 2000; 
dan Gumanti, 2001), reducing firm’s tax liabilities (Boyton et al., 1992), and 
increasing likelihood o f  obtaining import relief or increasing the amount o f  relief 
granted (Jones, 1991). They have also observed earnings management in 
response to more opportunistic incentives such as bonus plan targets (Healy, 
1985; Holthausen et al., 1995) and proxy contest (DeAngelo# 1988, 
Pourceu,1993).
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In trying to get a handle on which dial managers will reach for when they decide 
to manage earnings, it will also need to consider a variety o f  factors to limit 
earnings management. A fundamental question posed for accounting research is 
to identify the condition that would limit or wider the opportunity to the practice 
of earnings management (Jiambalvo, 1996). Analytical model have 
demonstrated that the existence o f  information asymmetry between firms 
management and firm shareholders is a necessary condition for a practice of 
earnings management (Dye, 1988; Trueman and Titman, 1988). Thus there are a 
principal factor that generate earnings management. That is the inability o f  
manager to communicate all dimensions o f  their private information to 
shareholders. High level o f  information asymmetry between manager and 
shareholder is evidence o f  shareholders lacking sufficient resources, incentives, 
or access to relevant information to monitor manager action (Schipper, 1989). 
When information asymmetry' is high such firm may able to manage earnings 
without being detected by outsiders.
Information Asymm etry and Investment Opportunity Set
The information asymmetry could be relatively larger for firms with relatively 
more growth opportunities or investment opportunity set than firms with 
relatively more asset-in place. The greater investment opportunity set, the more 
likely the firm will not be monitored as effectively as firm with less investment 
opportunity set. Firms with relatively more investment opportunity set, which 
largely comprised o f  intangible growth options more difficult to monitor, or less 
observable. On the other hand, if firm is comprised largely o f  asset-in place it is 
relatively easy for outsider to monitor. Thus the asymmetric information could 
be relatively larger for firms with relatively more investment opportunity set 
than firms with relatively more asset-in place (Ambarish ct al„ 1987; Skinner, 
1993). Managers o f  firms with relatively more investment opportunity set would 
have wider opportunity or more discretion to manage earnings. The incentive 
may be the same anytime, but the opportunity to manage earnings may be 
hampered if the firm largely comprises asset-in place, which is relatively easy 
monitored by outsiders.
Hypotheses Developm ent
A vast number o f  incentives for earnings management have been proposed in the 
academic literature. Manager of  firms that are close to violating debt covenant 
engage earnings management that reduce the likelihood o f  default (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Due to the cost o f  accessing actual debt covenant 
information, related prior research has generally used a proxy for the existence
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and tightness o f  accounting-based covenants. The most frequently used proxy is 
the debt-equity ratio or leverage (Dhaliwai. 1990; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 
1981; Daley and Vigeland, 1983; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994).
Manager o f  firm that are confront with the possibility o f  politically imposed 
wealth transfer will practice earnings management that reduce the likelihood or 
size o f  the transfer. Manager would manage earnings downward because lower 
reported earnings will result in benefit in the form o f  tax. political, and 
regulation consideration, which exceed the additional cost to be incurred in form 
of adjustment for. Researches generally have used firm size to measure the 
firm's venera'oility to political cost (Daley and Vigeland, 1993, Sweeney, 1994; 
Skinner. 1994).
Prior researches in accounting (Dhaliwai et al, 1982; iNeuniub, 1989, Warfield e! 
al., 1995) examine the role o f  ownership structure in resolve potential manager- 
shareholder conflicts. A dominant public shareholder has both incentive and 
ability to monitor management so that the firm is managed in a manner 
consistent with profit maximization. The greater managerial ownership the less 
likely is conflict o f  interest over the accounting choice because the stock price 
effect is more likely to dominate the compensation effect. Thus increase 
incentive for opportunistic behavior when managerial ownership is low 
(Warfield el al., 1995).
Managers across firms may be have the same incentive to do manage earnings, 
but the opportunity to do so may be available only in some firms, or the 
opportunity is available to all firms but the extant to which it can be done differ 
across firms. Trueman and Titman (1988) and Dye (1988) present analytical 
model have demonstrated that the existence of information asymmetry between 
firm management and firm shareholder is a necessary condition for the practice 
o f  earnings management. Firms with relatively more investment opportunity set, 
which largely comprised o f  intangible growth options more difficult to monitor, 
or less observable. On the other hand, if  firm is comprised largely o f  asset-in 
place it is relatively easy for outsider to monitor. Thus the asymmetric 
information could be relatively larger for firms with relatively more investment 
opportunity set than firms with relatively more asset-in place (Ambarish et al., 
1987; Skinner, 1993). The incentive may be the same anytime, but the 
opportunity to manage earnings may be hampered if the firm largely comprises 
asset-in place, which is relatively easy monitored by outsiders. This suggests 
hypotheses:
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H 1: The higher level o f  the firm’s investment opportunity set, the greater o f  the 
positive impact o f  financial leverage in the magnitude of earnings 
management.
H2: The higher level o f  the firm’s investment opportunity set, the greater o f  the 
negative impact o f  firm size in the magnitude o f  earnings management.
H3: The higher level o f  the firm’s investment opportunity set, the greater o f  the 
positif impact o f  public ownership o f  firm outstanding stock in the 
magnitude o f  earnings management.
Research Method
Variables and M easurement
Variables are discretionary accruals, investment opportunity set, financial 
leverage, firms size, and proportion o f  public ownership o f  firm outstanding 
stock. This study focuses on discretionary accrual as measure o f  earning 
management. Measure o f  earnings management, discretionary accrual or 
managed accounting accrual, is estimated using the expected normal accrual 
from total accounting accrual. Expected accounting accrual is estimated using 
cross-sectional approach. Measures o f  expected accounting accrual used in this 
study are estimated using modification o f  the Jones (1991).
This study use common factor analysis to decompose each individual measure 
into one factor common to the individual measures opportunity set. This study 
use among the investment opportunities set proxies that commonly used, these 
are ratio o f  market to book assets, ratio o f  market to book equity, ratio of 
market to book fixed assets, the earnings to price ratio, and ratio o f  capital 
expenditure to book assets. The level o f  financial leverage is used as proxy for 
the existence and tightness o f  accounting based debt covenant (Duke and Hunt, 
1990; and Press and Weintrop, 1990). This study use total debt to book assets 
ratio as a measure o f  financial leverage. Firm size is measured by natural log of 
total assets. The level o f  public ownership is computed as percent of 
outstanding shared owned by public.
Models
This study propose the following model to test the moderating effect of 
investment opportunity set on the relation between leverage, managerial 
ownership, and size, and the magnitude earnings management.
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M odel 1: A AM , = ft, + /3, UTBA„ + fh  UKR„ -/?< PKP„ + /?, IOS„
+ £„ ( 1)
M odel 2: AAM„ =fi, + p , JJTBA,, + p2 UKR„ + p 3 PKP„ + p 4 /OS,,
+ PiUTBA,, *IOS„ + p6UKR„ *IOS„ 4  
PtPKP„ *IOS„ +e„ (2)
where MAA is the managed (discretionary) accounting accrual; lOS is the level 
o f  investment opportunity set; UTBA is financial leverage; UKR is firm size: 
and PKP is proportion o f  public ownership o f  firm outstanding stock. The level 
o f  discretionary' accrual serves as measure the extent that managers manage
reported income.
1 he hypotheses (H I. 112, and H3) will be tested by estimating /?i. p,„ and p- in 
Model 2. If /?,-(+), p () (-) and /?-(+) arc statisticall\ significant at the level o f 5%. 
H0|. Ho2. and H0i are rejected, respectively. Rejecting H0|, H02, and Hu;, Indicate 
there are a moderating effect o f  investment opportunity set on the association 
between financial leverage, firm size, public ownership and the magnitude of 
earnings management.
Data and Sample
Data o f  this study are some information reported in annual financial statement of 
publicly held companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) for the period from 
1997 until 2000. Data source is Pusat Referensi Pasar Modal Indonesia (PRPM).
Samples o f  this research consist o f  88 manufacturing firms which tilled 
following criteria: 1) Firms are categorize in manufacturing firm; 2) Firms are 
listed in JSX since the first January o f  1997; 3) Firms are belong to specific 
industry in manufacturing which have at least seven members: and 4) firms 
publish complete financial statement for period 1997-2000.
Result
Analysis of Investment Opportunities Set Proxies
I his research follows general steps in application o f  factor analysis techniques 
as in Hair et al. (1995). Based on factor analysis, one representative factor is 
extracted from a set o f  investment opportunity proxy variables. Factor score for
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one representative factor replace original investment opportunity set variables 
for use in subsequent multivariate analysis.
Table 1
Panel A. Measure o f Sampling Adequacy
1997 1998 1999 2000
MSA 0,504 0,511 0,521 0,500
Panel B. Bartlett’s Test o f Sphericity
1997 1998 1999 2000
Bartlett’s test 27,468” 19,125*' 19,239" 94,675"
Panel C. MSA and Partial Correlation
Year 1997
Variable
NPBE
ATBA
NPAT
NPBE 
0 ,5 0 8 a 
0,284** 
-0,066
ATBA
0,5 0 3 “
-0,398*’
NPAT 
0 ,5 0 4 a
Year 1998
Variable
NPBE
ATBA
NPAT
NPBE 
0 ,5 3 0 a 
0.208** 
-0.055
ATBA
0,5 0 7 a 
-0.354**
NPAT 
0 ,5 1 0 a
Year 1999
Variable
HSLS
ATBA
NPAT
HSLS 
0 ,6 9 4 a 
0,096 
-0,090
ATBA
0,514a 
-0,394”
NPAT
0,514“
Year 2000
Variable
NPBA
NPAT
NPBA  
0 ,5 0 0 a 
0,770“
NPAT 
0 ,5 0 0 a
a Measures o f  Sampling Adequacy (MSA)
"‘ Significant at the levels 1%
* Significant at the levels 5%
where: HSLS is earnings to price ratio, NPBE is ratio o f  market to book equity, NPBA is 
ratio o f  market to book fixed assets, ATBA ratio o f  capital expenditure to book 
assets. NPAT ratio o f  market to book fixed assets
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 show descriptive statistics for variables o f  this study.
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Standard deviation
AAM 356 3,682 2,832 7,702
IOS 356 -0,055 -0,108 1,156
UTB 356 81,624 76,982 47,711
A 356 1 1 ,6 6 8 11,590 0,568
UKR
PKP
356 27,381 26,452 15,464
Where:
AAM = Discretionary accruals (%), IOS = Investment opportunity set (index), 
UTBA = Financial leverage (%), UKR = firm size (loglO, rupiah), PKP = public 
ownership (%).
Mean and median values for: a) discretionary accruals are 3,68% and 2,83% 
from total assets in beginning period; b) investment opportunity set are -0,055 
and -0,108; c) financial leverage are 81,62% and 76,98%; d) firm size (in 
natural log value) are 11,668 rupiahs and 11,590 rupiahs; and e) public 
ownership o f  firm outstanding stock are 27,38% and 26,45%.
Hypotheses Testing
Table 3 show the result o f  multiple regression The calculated F value o f  Model 1 
is 4,414 and probability value o f  it is 0,002, statistically significant at level o f  
5%. The calculated F value o f  Model 2 is 3,439 and probability value o f  it is 
0,001, statistically significant at level o f  5%. Based on the assumption test, all 
models are free from multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorelation. 
Relying on central limit theorem , this study can use normality assumption. There 
for, the usual test procedures are still valid asymptotically
The coefficients o f  investment opportunity set are 0,010 in Model 1 and 0,002 
in Model 2. The calculated t value and the probability value o f  these coefficients 
are 2,619 and 0,005 in Model I, and 0,018 and 0,498 in Model 2. In conclusion.
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at the one-side level o f  significance 5% that coefficient in Model 1 is statistically 
significance, but in Model 2 it is not statistically significance. The result o f  
analysis based on Model 1, the finding consistent with Gul et al. (2000) that 
investment opportunity set is positively associates with earnings management. 
Overall, this result support argument that investment opportunity set moderate 
the association o f  incentives and the magnitude of earnings management.
The coefficient o f  interaction between financial leverage and investment 
opportunity set in Model 2 is 0,010. The calculated t value o f  this coefficient is 
1,661 and the probability value o f  it is 0,049. At the one-side significance level 
5%, H0| is rejected. Rejecting o f  H0| means that empirical evidence support the 
hypothesis that the higher level o f  the firm's investment opportunity set, the 
greater o f  the positive impact o f  financial leverage in the magnitude o f  earnings 
management.
The coefficient o f  interaction between firm size and investment opportunity set 
in Model 2 is -0,001. The calculated t value o f  this coefficient is -0 ,157 and the 
probability value o f  it is 0,458. Even at the one-side significance level 10%, H02 
is not rejected. Not rejecting o f  H02 means that empirical evidence does not 
support argument that the higher level o f  the firm’s investment opportunity set, 
the greater o f  the negative impact o f  firm size in the magnitude o f  earnings 
management.
The coefficient o f  interaction between public ownership o f  outstanding shares 
and investment opportunity set in Model 2 is 0,032. The calculated t value o f  this 
coefficient is 2,146 and the probability value o f  it is 0,033. At the one-side 
significance level 5%, H03 is rejected. Rejecting o f  H03 means that empirical 
evidence support the hypothesis that the higher level o f  the firm’s investment 
opportunity set, the greater o f  the positive impact o f  public ownership of 
outstanding shares in the magnitude o f  earnings management
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Table 3 
Result o f M ultiple Regression
Model 1: AAM,, = f3„ + [J, UTBA,, + fc  UKR,, +p3 PKP,, + p 4 IOS,, +£„ 
M odel 2: A AM,, =j% + /?, UTBA,, + p 2 UKR„ + p 3 PKP,, + p 4 IOS,,
+ p,UTBA,, *IOS„ + p 6UKR„ *IOS„ + p,PKP„*10S„ +e„
Variable Coefficient t-statistics p - value
Model 1
Intercept 0,106 1,277 0,102
UTBA 0,033 3.781
UKR - -1,146 0,000*’*
PK.P 0,008 0,044 0,127
IOS 0,001 2,619 0,483
0,010
R2(Adjusted) 0,005*'*
F 0,048
(0,037)
Model 2 4,414“ *
Intercept 1,110
UTBA 4,033
UKR 0,092 -1,021 0,134
PKP 0,036 0,363
IOS -0,007 0,018 0,000***
UTBA*IOS 0,010 1,661 0.150
UKR*IOS 0,002 -0,157 0,358
PKP*10S 0,010 2,146
-0,001 0,498
R2 (Adjusted) 0,062 0,049"
F 0,458
0,065
(0,046) 0,033**
tn _ .---- —----------- 3,439***
Significant at the levels 1% 
Significant at the levels 5% 
Significant at the levels 10%
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Concluding Remarks
Based on result and analyses o f  sample this research concludes the following. 
Firstly, empirical evidence show that there are positive discretionary accruals. 
The finding support argument that earnings management is common practice in 
general situation. Secondly investment opportunity set positively associate with 
discretionary accruals. The high level o f investment opportunity set indicate the 
high level o f  asymmetry information, mean o f  bid ask spread (as proxy for 
asymmetry information) for high investment opportunity firm is 1.327,15 and 
227,65 for low investment opportunity set. Than the Finding support prediction 
o f  this study that the higher o f  investment opportunity set the wider of 
management opportunity to manage their earnings. Thirdly, based on of 
moderating effect analysis o f  investment opportunity set on the association of 
incentives and magnitude o f  earnings management, this result show that higher 
the investment opportunity set level the greater o f  positive effect financial 
leverage and public ownership of outstanding shares on magnitude o f  earnings 
management.
Suggestion
This research show empirical evidence of earnings management practice among 
listed company in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The refinement o f  this research might 
investigate special component o f  accruals. Investigation o f  special accruals that 
management used to engage earnings management would be valuable for 
standard setter in identifying the standard which need for evaluation. Further 
research can use others factor that would limit the ability o f  manager to manage 
their earnings. If earnings management can be limited by transparence o f  
financial reporting environment, than further research can investigate the effect 
o f  auditor quality on earnings management.
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